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ARE YOU MY MOTHER?: REMOVING A GESTATIONAL
SURROGATE'S NAME FROM THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN
THE NAME OF EQUAL PROTECTION
ERIN V. PODOLNY*
In the case of In re Roberto d.B.,1 the Maryland Court of
Appeals considered whether a child's birth certificate must list the
name of the gestational surrogate as the child's mother when neither
the child's father nor the gestational surrogate wanted her name on the
document. The court held that under Maryland's Equal Rights
Amendment,3 women should be afforded the same opportunity as men
to avoid parental duties and obligations where no genetic relationship
exists between the child and the parent.4 The court concluded that the
gestational surrogate's name could be removed from the child's birth
certificate and a new birth certificate naming only a father could be
issued.5 The court's decision upholds equal protection of the law in
Maryland for both men and women: it protects a woman's right to
serve as a surrogate without fear of being burdened with the legal and
social obligations of motherhood,6 and supports a man's right to serve
as the sole parent of a child.7 While expanding the parental rights for
both men and women, the court's decision may affect how parents will
proceed in obtaining an "accurate" birth certificate when using a
surrogate as well as how hospitals should proceed when filling out a
child's birth certificate. 8 In addition, the court's decision raises social
and ethical issues such as whether a child's best interests should be
considered and represented in hearings where a birth certificate is
significantly modified. 9
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, 2009; B.A., Washington University
in St. Louis, 2004. I would like to thank my parents and my sister for their support and
encouragement.
1. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007).
2. Id. at 117.
3. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46.
4. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 124.
5. Id. at 126.
6. See infra Part IV(2)(i).
7. See infra Part IV(2)(ii).
8. See infra Part IV(3).
9. See infra Part IV(3).
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I. THE CASE
Roberto d.B., an unmarried male, wanted children of his own.10
In December 2000, he initiated an in vitro fertilization procedure that
resulted in the birth of twin girls on August 23, 2001.11 Roberto d.B.'s
sperm and a donor's 12 eggs were implanted in a gestational surrogate
mother who carried the children to term.13 As required for every birth,
the hospital's medical records department reported the birth
information to the Maryland Division of Vital Records (MDVR) for
the issuance of the birth certificates. 14 The medical records department
reported the gestational surrogate as the "mother" of the children on
the birth certificate, which is the standard procedure unless otherwise
provided by a court order. 15
Neither Roberto d.B. nor the gestational surrogate wanted the
surrogate's name on the children's birth certificates because both
agreed that she would not serve as the children's mother.' 6 Roberto
d.B. filed a Petition for Determination of Parentage and Issuance of
Accurate Certificates of Birth to the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, to which the surrogate joined. 17 In it, he requested that the
hospital be authorized to report only the name of the father to the
MDVR and the issuance of an "accurate" birth certificate; in other
words, one that did not list the gestational surrogate as the mother.' 8
Furthermore, Roberto d.B. requested that the court designate him as
the father and assign the twins his surname. 19 Three affidavits
accompanied the petition: one from Roberto d.B., another from the
10. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d. at 117.
11. Id.
12. The egg donor was not a party to this action. Id. at 119.
13. Id. Gestational surrogacy is where the sperm and egg are artificially united and the
surrogate is impregnated with the resulting fertilized embryo. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). The gestational surrogate is simply the carrier of
the child; she and the child are not genetically related. See Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d
54, 57 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994). This is in contrast to traditional surrogacy, where a woman is
impregnated with the sperm of a man (not her husband), with the understanding that the
resulting child will be that of the man and (usually) his wife. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. In this instance, the surrogate is both the egg donor and the carrier, and
she is therefore the child's genetic mother. Id.
14. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d. at 117-18.
15. Id. at 118.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 118-19, 119 n.3.
18. Id. at 118-19.
19. Id. at 138 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
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gestational surrogate, and the third from the egg donor.20 On August
29, 2001, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the
petition without a hearing. 2 1 On or around September 17, 2001,
Roberto d.B. filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that his
petition's denial permitted the reporting of inaccurate information to
the official state records, and that placement of the surrogate's name
22
on the birth certificate imposed future negative legal consequences.
Specifically, Roberto d.B. argued that including the surrogate's name
on the birth certificate limited Roberto d.B.'s parental rights as well as
the future inheritance rights of the children in question and the
surrogate's biological children.
23
On October 2, 2001, the circuit court issued an order that
fulfilled some, but not all, of Roberto d.B.'s requests. 24 The order
declared Roberto d.B. the father of the twin girls and directed the
MDVR to issue the twins' birth certificates under Roberto d.B.'s
surname. 25 The court did not, however, allow the removal of the
gestational surrogate's name from the twins' birth certificates.
26
Roberto d.B. filed a request for hearing on the reconsideration
request.27 On January 14, 2002, the court held the hearing on the
previously denied motion for reconsideration, where Roberto d.B.'s
counsel (a replacement of his original counsel) first made an equal
protection argument to the court.2 8 On July 9, 2002, the Circuit Court
issued a bench ruling reaffirming and explaining its earlier denial of
the motion for reconsideration. 29 The trial judge reasoned that it would
not be in the best interests of the children to declare them "effectively
motherless" 30 and found that there was no Maryland case law that
allowed a trial court to remove a mother's name from a birth
certificate.3'
20. Id. In their respective affidavits, the egg donor and the surrogate both stated that
they did not want any relationship or responsibility for the children, and that they did not want
to be listed on the birth certificates as the mother. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 138-39.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 139.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Note that no counsel was retained to protect the interests of the children. Id.
29. Id. at 140.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 119 (majority opinion). The trial judge also stated that "[t]his is not an
appropriate issue for adoption" but did not say why. Id. n.4.
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Roberto d.B. appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, 32 but
the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own motion in advance
of any Court of Special Appeals proceedings. 33 The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari to decide whether the name of a genetically
unrelated gestational surrogate must be listed as the "mother" on the
child's birth certificate.
34
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Advances in reproductive technology over the past several
decades have impacted and will continue to change health and family
law regarding parentage in the future. 35 However, as is typical of the
relationship between the law and science, the law does not adapt as
quickly as science advances, and courts must often grapple with
legislation and case law that do not provide adequate guidance. 36 In
these instances, judges must be creative; 37 they must apply statutes and
case law to new scientific developments while preserving legislative
and judicial intent and policy.38
The courts in Maryland and across the country have tried to
adapt to the changes in reproductive technology by creating new tests,
amending statutes, and recalling the underlying goals of constitutions
when making a judicial decision. For instance, when an individual or a
couple uses artificial reproductive technologies 39 to have a child, and a
dispute arises regarding a determination of the biological and legal
32. Id. at 140 (Harrell, J., dissenting). The surrogate did not join in the appeal to the
Court of Special Appeals. Id.
33. Id. at 119 (majority opinion).
34. Id. at 117.
35. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological
Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 505, 506-07
(2005).
36. See Laura A. Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v.
Superior Court of Orange County: An Urgent Cry for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy,
39 CATH. LAW. 241, 243-44 (1999).
37. See Moses, supra note 35, at 507.
38. Id. ".... [J]udges can interpret the words in a statute to accommodate advances in
technology, including within the scope of a statute conduct that was not possible at the time it
was drafted." Id.
39. "Artificial reproductive technologies" collectively refers to technologies that allow
those who cannot conceive children through intercourse to reproduce using various medical
procedures such as sperm donation, egg donation, in vitro fertilization, traditional surrogacy,
and gestational surrogacy. CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 8-10
(2006).
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parents of that child, courts across the country have created various
tests to determine the parentage.40 While little case law exists in
Maryland on the use of reproductive technologies, the Maryland
Annotated Code has been amended to allow for the use of scientific
advances where there is a dispute over parentage. 41 For instance,
Maryland paternity statutes allow for blood or genetics testing where
paternity is disputed or contested 42 and the courts will set aside a prior
determination of parentage if the results of blood or genetics tests
prove that the individual originally named is not the parent.43 Finally,
Maryland courts have also used the Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment in disputes involving parentage by preventing unequal
treatment between men and women in child support and custody
cases.
44
A. Artificial Reproductive Technologies and the Law
Because many states lack legislation that outlines how to
determine a child's legal parentage, there is inconsistency in how
courts determine the legal mother of a child born through gestational
surrogacy.45 Generally, there are three tests that courts may use.46 The
most traditional test is the "birth test," which looks to the individual
40. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 39, 133-38.
41. See e.g. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (West 2007); see also MD. CODE ANN.
FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007). The Code, however, is still traditional in some ways; for
example, two sections of the Annotated Code uphold the "presumption of legitimacy." See
MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West 2007) and MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS §
1-206(a) (West 2007).
42. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (West 2007).
43. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007).
44. See e.g., Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900, 905 (Md. 1977) (holding that the Maryland
Equal Rights Amendment requires that male and female parents share financial child support
obligations equally); Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029, 1040 (Md. 1998) (finding that the lower
court's decision to grant custody to a child's mother was a sex-based decision and was
therefore invalid under the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment).
45. Compare Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
individuals who intended to procreate the child through the use of in vitro fertilization, not the
surrogate who carried the child, are the natural parents and legal parents under California law)
with Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54, 64-66 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994) (holding that the
genetic parents are both the natural parents and the legal parents unless they have waived their
legal rights to the child).
46. See Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 60-61. Historically, courts have used either blood
tests (or by today's standards, genetics tests) or birth to determine the parent of a child. Id. at
60. However, Johnson added a third test, the "intent test," which looks to the intentions of the
individuals who initiated the birth of a child through artificial reproductive technologies. Id. at
61; see also Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
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who gave birth to determine the natural parent.47 Next is the "genetics
test," which grants parentage to the biological parents of the child.48
Finally, the courts most recently created the "intent test," which says
that whoever intended to be the parents of the child are the child's
legal parent or parents.
49
The intent test was first introduced in Johnson v. Calvert,
50
where a couple entered into a surrogacy contract with a woman who
was then impregnated with the couple's fertilized embryo. 51 A dispute
ensued over the surrogate's compensation, and then the surrogate
claimed she was the mother of the child and refused to give the child
52to the couple. The California Supreme Court held that because the
couple intended to procreate and raise the child, they were the legal
parents.53
In contrast to the decision in Johnson, the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas in Belsito v. Clark54 used a hybrid test that combined
the traditional genetics and birth tests with an intent test to determine a
child's legal parents.55 In Belsito, a couple who used a gestational
surrogate to have a child wanted their names, not the name of the
surrogate, listed on the child's birth certificate. 56 The court likened
surrogacy to adoption and rejected the pure intent test proposed in
Johnson because it felt that the test did not address important public
policy concerns that are considered in adoption proceedings, such as
47. Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 60.
48. Id.
49. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. Intended parents are usually the individual or
individuals who initiated the process of having a child through artificial reproductive
technologies, typically because they could not conceive a child naturally. KINDREGAN &
MCBRIEN, supra note 39, at 14, 119-21; see also id. at 326. Courts have also looked to
surrogacy contracts to determine who the legal mother of the child should be. See A.H.W. v.
G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000), where the court found that the genetic
mother and father of the child should be placed on the birth certificate, not the gestational
surrogate, per their surrogacy contract. Id. at 953-54. However, the court made this decision
contingent on the gestational surrogate surrendering her parental rights to the child only after
seventy-two hours (required by New Jersey statute), after which the birth certificate with the
genetic parents listed could be issued. Id. at 954.
50. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
51. Id. at 778.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 782; see also In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1410 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (designating the couple who initiated the conception process using an egg
donor, sperm donor, and gestational surrogate to be the legal parents, even though the couple
was not genetically related to the child and had separated by the time the child was bom).
54. 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1994).
55. Id. at 64-66.
56. Id. at 57-58.
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allowing for an "unpressured surrender" of the surrogate's potential
parental rights, and allowing the court to review and ensure the
suitability of the intended parents.57
The court articulated two inquiries that must be made in
determinin the legal parents of a child carried by a gestational
surrogate. 5 The court first asked, using a pure genetics test, who the
natural parents of the child are. 59 The court then asked who the legal
parents of the child should be, answering the question by determining
if the natural (genetic) parents had waived their legal rights to the child
(such as in the case of adoption).60 If the natural parents did not waive
their rights, then they are named the legal parents of the child.6a The
court answered these queries and found the couple to be the legal
parents of the child because they were the natural parents and did not
waive their legal rights to the child.6 The court thus ordered that the
birth certificate list the names of the child's genetic parents and not the
surrogate mother's name.
63
B. History and Purpose of Parentage Statutes in Maryland
The Family Law Article of Maryland's Annotated Code does
not explicitly address how to determine the legal parents of a child
carried by a gestational surrogate, nor does it give guidance on what
information should appear on such a child's birth certificate. However,
Maryland's parentage statutes 64 and their recent amendments do take
into account some modem technology, such as blood and genetics
testing, when making parentage determinations. 6
5
In 1984, the General Assembly incorporated parentage statutes
into Maryland's Family Law Article 66to promote the general welfare
57. Id. at 62-64.
58. Id. at 65-66.
59. Id. at 64-65. The court explained that it would look to the genetics test because of
the abundant precedent for the test as well as its concerns for the best interests of the child and
public policy. Id. at 64.
60. Id. at 65-66. It is in this second inquiry that there are hints of the intent test because
by waiving one's legal rights, a person is showing that they do not intend to be the legal parent
of the child. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 126 n. 15 (Md. 2007).
61. Belsito, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d at 66.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 5-1001-1058 (West 2007).
65. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (West 2007), MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007).
66. See 1984 Md. Laws, page no. 1852.
2008]
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and best interests of children born out of wedlock" and give such
children the same rights as those born within wedlock.67 The statutes
do not explicitly consider artificial reproductive technologies. In
addition, the statutes are not gender-neutral, meaning they deal almost
exclusively with issues relating to the father such as the determination
of the father's identity68 and paternal child support obligations.
69
However, in 1995 the Family Law Article was amended to allow for
some advances in reproductive technologies. For example, section 5-
1029 was one of several adopted amendments, and it allows for the use
of blood and genetics testing to determine paternity.7 While the
amendment says that a mother, child, or alleged father can be tested by
order of the court, the only stated purpose of such testing is to
determine the identity of the father of the child, with no mention of a
similar determination for the mother.71
Similarly, section 5-1038, which the General Assembly most
recently amended in 1997, 72 allows a declaration of paternity to be set
aside or modified "if a blood or genetic test ... establishes the
exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order." 73 Prior to
the amendment of section 5-1038, courts did not modify prior
determinations of paternity unless the alleged father provided evidence
of "fraud, mistake, or irregularity. ' 74 The problems with this
requirement were demonstrated in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W.,75 where a
court refused to vacate an earlier declaration of paternity despite blood
test results that showed the putative father was not the biological
father.76 The court refused to vacate the decision because the father
67. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1002(b)(1) (West 2007). Ironically, another purpose
of the statute is to "simplify the procedures for determining paternity;" MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 5-1002(b)(3) (West 2007), however, with the advances in reproductive technology
since 1984, this purpose has become a distant memory.
68. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 1027(c)(1) (West 2007) (presuming that the
husband of the woman who gives birth to the child during their marriage is the father of the
child); see also MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 1029(b) (West 2007) (allowing blood or genetic
tests to determine the identity of a child's father).
69. See MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 1032(a)(2) (West 2007).
70. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (West 2007).
71. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029(b) (West 2007).
72. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007).
73. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) (West 2007).
74. Langston v. Rifle, 754 A.2d 389, 393 (Md. 2000); see MD. R. Civ. P. CIR. CT. 2-535
(authorizing trial judges to exercise its revisory power to modify final judgments in cases of
"fraud, mistake, or irregularity").
75. 648 A.2d 439 (Md. 1994).
76. Id. at 447.
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could not provide evidence of "fraud, mistake, or irregularity."77 The
General Assembly enacted section 5-1038 specifically to overturn
Tandra S. v. Tyrone W.
78
In Langston v. Riffe79 the Maryland Court of AVeals clarified
the meaning and scope of sections 5-1029 and 5-1038. In Langston,
several paternity cases were combined to address the issue of whether
a putative father was entitled to a blood test after a prior determination
that he was the father of the child, and whether the best interests of the
child played a role in the court's decision to reconsider paternity. 8 The
court explained that under sections 5-1029 and 5-1038, if a putative
father moved to set aside a prior determination of paternity that had
been established not through a blood or genetics testing, the court was
obligated to make blood or genetics testing available to him and to
allow him to present any evidence of those tests. 82 The court explained
that the opportunity for genetics or blood testing was a right of a
putative father for relief from potentially false paternity
d&terminations. 83 The court therefore reasoned that the best interests of
the child should not be a factor in the court's decision to allow the
blood test because such a determination would "violate the mandatory
tenets of section 5-1029 and the Legislature's intent" in enacting these
statutes. 84
While the purpose and structure of the parentage statutes in
Maryland have changed over the last few decades, they do not fully
address the advances in reproductive technology presented in the case
of In re Roberto d.B.
C. Equal Rights and Parentage
Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment,85 adopted by the
General Assembly in 1972, states that "[e]quality of rights under the
law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.' 86 While the
United States Supreme Court has applied an "intermediate-level
77. Id.
78. Langston, 754 A.2d at 393.
79. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
80. Id. at 392, 393-94.
81. Id. at 392.
82. Id. at 406.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 46.
86. Id.
20081
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scrutiny" to government actions that draw a distinction between
genders, 87 Maryland courts apply a "strict scrutiny" standard to Equal
Rights Amendment claims. 8 Under strict scrutiny in Maryland, the
court will find a statute that draws distinctions based on gender
unconstitutional "unless the distinction formed by it is necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest." 89
Maryland courts have applied the Equal Rights Amendment to
various issues relating to exercising one's parental rights. In Rand v.
Rand,90 a landmark case from 1977, the divorced parents of a child
disputed over how much child support the father (who did not have
custody of the child) should pay.9' The mother argued, and the
chancellor held, that the father should contribute his entire earnings
(after payment of "personal expenses") to child support, which would
have totaled ninety-two percent of the total amount the mother alleged
was reasonable for the care of their child (leaving the mother
responsible to pay for only eight percent of the expenses for the child's
care).92
The mother appealed the decision to the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, arguing that the chancellor erred in not ordering the
father to pay more towards their child's support. 93 The Maryland Court
of Special Appeals found the allocation of ninety-two percent of the
support to the father to be clearly erroneous, and modified the
allocation of support to be based on each parent's net monthly income
available after personal expenses.94 The mother then appealed to the
Court of Appeals, arguing that she should only be obligated to pay
child support to the extent to which the father is incapable of paying.5
The Court of Appeals dismissed the mother's argument and explained
that the father's common law obligation to support his minor children
is outdated and that Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment requires
87. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
88. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 n.38 (Md. 2007); see also State v.
Burning Tree Club, Inc., 554 A.2d 366, 386 (Md. 1989) ("The level of scrutiny to which the
classifications [based on sex] are subject is 'at least the same scrutiny as racial
classifications."' (quoting Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817, 840 (Md. 1985)).
89. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 603 (internal citations omitted).
90. 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977).
91. Id. at 901-02.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 902.
95. Id.
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that both parents share the financial support of their children in
accordance with each parent's financial resources.
96
Similarly, the court in Giffin v. Crane97 firmly upheld the Equal
Rights Amendment in the context of parentage. 98 In Giffin, a divorced
couple entered into an agreement that gave both parents joint legal
custody and the father physical custody of their two daughters. 99 The
parties also agreed to allow a mental health professional to review the
residential status of the children annually. After one review, the
mental health professional recommended that the children live with
their mother instead of their father because the older daughter had the
"emotional need to be with her mother" during that period in her
life.' 01 The trial court agreed with this recommendation and recognized
the daughter's "need for a female hand," and thus ordered a change in
physical custody of the girls. 10 2 The father appealed to the Court of
Appeals, arguing that it violated the Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment to consider gender in child custody cases. 103 The court
agreed with the father's argument and held that the trial court erred as
a matter of law when it used gender as the sole basis for making its
custody determination. 
04
Maryland courts have also discussed the Equal Rights
Amendment in the context of rebutting the "presumption of
legitimacy," which is found in both the Family Law Article 195 and the
Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code.'0 6 The presumption
96. Id. at 905; see also Kemp v. Kemp, 411 A.2d 1028, 1032 n.3 (Md. 1980). While the
court agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that parents should share in child support
payments, the court felt that it was for the chancellor to decide how to allocate the payments
between parents, rather than using the "net income after personal expenses" test used by the
Court of Special Appeals. Rand, 374 A.2d at 905.
97. 716 A.2d 1029 (Md. 1998).
98. Id. at 1040.
99. Id. at 1030-31.
100. Id. at 1031.
101. Id. at 1031, 1032 n.2.
102. Id. at 1033.
103. Id. The father first appealed to the Court of Special Appeals where he made the
same argument. Id. In an unreported decision, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, reasoning that it was a valid to consider gender in making custody determinations. Id.
104. Id. at 1040.
105. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West 2007).
106. MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (West 2007). While the definitions of the
presumption of legitimacy differ only slightly between the two Articles, the courts have
interpreted them to mean different things. Under § 5-1029 of the Family Law Article, a
putative father has an absolute right to a blood test upon any party's motion, and the court has
no discretion over whether to grant a blood test or not. Evans v. Wilson, 856 A.2d 679, 686
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of legitimacy occurs when a child born or conceived during a marriage
is presumed to be the legitimate child of both spouses. °7 This
presumption was at issue in Evans v. Wilson, 18 where Wilson
conceived a child when she was married to one man while having an
affair with her ex-boyfriend at the same time.109 Wilson and her
husband raised and cared for the child, but Wilson indicated to Evans
that the child was his."10 Evans filed a Complaint to Determine
Paternity and requested that a blood test be conducted to determine the
paternity of the child.'"
Evans argued that under Langston v. Riffe 12 and the paternity
statutes in the Family Law Article, he should be automatically entitled
to a blood test at his request.' 3 The court, however, found that a
putative father's absolute right to a blood test discussed in Langston
only applied when the child was born out of wedlock. 14 Because in
Evans' case, the mother of the child was married at the time of the
conception and birth of the child, the court looked to the Estates and
Trusts Article and applied the standard for children born in wedlock,
which allowed consideration of the best interests of the child.' The
court held that because Evans had not overcome the statutory
presumption that Wilson's husband was the father of the child, Evans
was not entitled to a blood test.11
6
Judge Irma S. Raker dissented, arguing in part that the
majority's decision violated Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment." 7
She explained that where the child's mother is married, the mother has
(Md. 2004). However, under § 1-206 of the Estates and Trusts Article, the court has discretion
in granting a blood test and the court can consider the best interests of the child when
determining whether the father has overcome the presumption of legitimacy. Id. at 687-88.
This difference between the two sections is attributed to whether the child has been born
within wedlock or not. Id. at 687. In cases where a child is born within wedlock, the court has
said that an action under the Estates and Trusts Article is the preferred avenue for determining
paternity. Id.
107. MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(a) (West 2007).
108. 856 A.2d 679 (Md. 2004).
109. Id. at681.
110. Id. at 682-683.
Ill. Id. at 683.
112. 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
113. Evans, 856 A.2d at 688.
114. Id. at 692. The court explained that section 5-1002 of the Family Law Article, which
explains the purpose of the article, aims to "ensure the protection and support of children born
out of wedlock." Id. (emphasis in original).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 693.
117. Id. at 701 (Raker, J., dissenting).
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the opportunity to rebut the presumption that her husband is the father
by filing a paternity action under the Family Law Article; 18 however,
to rebut the same presumption, the putative father must bring an action
under the Estates and Trusts Article, which, according to the
majority's opinion, is a more difficult burden to overcome because it
considers the best interests of the child.119 In other words, Judge Raker
argued, a biological father is more burdened than a biological mother
in rebutting the presumption of legitimacy, which is a violation of the
Equal Rights Amendment. 120 The majority rejected this argument and
said that its concern was to preserve a functioning family unit and to
act in the best interests of the child, not to provide equal protection for
biological mothers and fathers in rebutting the presumption of
legitimacy. 121
Maryland courts have also addressed the issue of equal rights
for men and women in the context of choosing a child's surname. In
Schroeder v. Broadfoot,122 an unmarried couple conceived a child, but
their relationship ended before the child was born. 12 3 The mother gave
the child her surname, which she adopted during a previous
marriage. 124 The father challenged this, claiming that the child would
be confused when he was older as to why he had the surname of his
mother's ex-husband.12 The lower court held that it was in the best
interest of the child to change the child's surname to match his father's
to avoid confusion when the child became older. 1
26
The mother appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its
discretion in ruling to change the child's name because the mother had
presented evidence that the child was not confused about who he or his
father were, which directly contradicted the trial court's holding. 1
27
The father argued, on the other hand, that the court had not
abused its discretion because the presumption in favor of giving the
child his surname could only be overcome in the case of abandonment
or serious misconduct, and he neither abandoned the child nor engaged
118. Id. at 702.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 695 n.7 (majority opinion).
122. 790 A.2d 773 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
123. Id. at 775.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 776.
126. Id. at 777.
127. Id.
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in misconduct to disgrace his surname.1 28 The Maryland Court of
Special Appeals clarified that the issue was how to determine the
surname of a child whose parents have equal rights and equal
responsibility over the child. 129 The court found that the trial court
used a legal presumption that was "a gender-based and gender-biased
preference that not only is outdated in the law but also would violate
the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment," namely that, absent evidence
of abandonment or serious misconduct by the father, it would be in the
best interests of the child for him to have his father's last name.130
Instead, the court suggested on remand that a pure best interests of the
child standard should apply.' 31
The legal system in Maryland and across the country has had to
adapt to the implications of advances in reproductive technology.
Courts have adapted to advances in reproductive technology by
modifying older tests and creating new ones, such as in Johnson and
Belsito. In addition, legislatures have reacted to these changes by
amending current statutes and creating new statutes to allow for blood
and genetics testing. Finally, courts have reinterpreted constitutional
provisions, such as the Equal Rights Amendment, to allow for changes
in both societal norms and science.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In the case of In re Roberto d.B., the Court of Appeals
considered whether a child's birth certificate could list only a father's
name in the absence of a mother's name when the child was carried by
a gestational surrogate and neither the father nor the surrogate wanted
the surrogate's name to appear on the birth certificate. 132 Chief Judge
Robert M. Bell delivered the opinion of the court, which held that
Maryland's paternity statutes must be construed to apply equally to
men and women to avoid a violation of the Maryland Equal Rights
Amendment. 133 The court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County and held that it was within the court's power to
128. Id. at 781.
129. Id. at 783.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 784. The court further held that if a father delays in seeking a determination of
paternity or objecting to the surname chosen by the mother, the court may view this as the
father acquiescing to the mother's choice. Id. at 784-85. If the father requests for a change in
the child's name thereafter, the court would apply an "extreme circumstances" standard. Id.
132. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 (Md. 2007).
133. Id. at 124.
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order the Maryland Division of Vital Records (MDVR) to issue a birth
certificate that lists only the father's name.
134
The court first discussed the origins of the paternity statutes'
35
in Maryland. 136 It explained that paternity statutes are typically used to
determine the paternity of a child and, if appropriate, impose the
"basic obligations and responsibilities of parenthood" on the parent.' 
37
The court then explained how the paternity statutes are used
procedurally, specifying that if a blood or genetic test shows that the
alleged father is not genetically related to the child, the court can set
aside or modify a declaration of parentage for that individual.' 38 The
court agreed with Roberto d.B.'s argument that under current
interpretation of the paternity statute, a male could successfully deny
paternity based on the lack of a genetic relationship with the child, but
a female could not.' 39 Instead, the female would be forced by the State
to be the "legal" mother of the child, despite any genetic connection
between herself and the child. 140
The court found that it was necessary to reinterpret the
paternity statutes and health law statutes so that men and women
would have equal opportunities to deny parentage.' 4 1 Specifically, the
court looked to section 4-211 of the Health General Article, which
addresses "authorization for new certificates of birth"'142 and allows the
MDVR to issue a new birth certificate if a court has "entered an order
as to the parentage .... ,,143 Because "parentage" is a gender-neutral
word, the court held that the MDVR could issue a birth certificate with
either no mother or no father at the order of a trial court. 144
The court concluded that the gestational surrogate's name
could be removed from the birth certificate because the gender-neutral
language of the paternity statutes allowed such an interpretation and
because the lower court's interpretation would offend Maryland's
134. Id. at 126.
135. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW §§ 5-1001-1058 (West 2007).
136. In reRoberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 120.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 121; see MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007).
139. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 122.
140. Id. at 121.
141. Id. at 121-22.
142. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 4-211 (West 2007).
143. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 121-22 (citing MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 4-
21 1(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007) (emphasis added)).
144. Id. The court went on to explain that because the paternity statutes were written in
1984, they do not accommodate for situations where children are conceived through
reproductive technology. Id. at 122.
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Equal Rights Amendment because it would, without "substantial
justification," afford an opportunity to one sex and not the other. 145
The court reversed the decision of the circuit court and held that it was
within the trial court's power to order the MDVR to issue a birth
certificate that lists only the father's name. 146 The case was remanded
to the Circuit Court of Montgomery County for proceedings consistent
with the court's judgment.' 4
Judges Dale R. Cathell, Glenn T. Harrell and Irma S. Raker
dissented. 148 Judge Cathell began by criticizing the process that
Roberto d.B. used to have children, calling it a "manufacturing
process" for babies. 149 Judge Cathell then criticized the majority's
opinion, arguing that it created a new "intent test" whereby if a woman
who gives birth to a child does not intend to be the mother of the child,
she can disclaim maternity of the child. 150 He argued that this new test
may itself be a violation of equal protection because a mother can
disclaim maternity simply because she did not intend to be a mother,
but a father cannot.' 5 ' Judge Cathell explained that there are many men
who at the time of intercourse do not intend to be fathers, but are often
judicially found to be obligated to provide child support. 152 The
145. Id. at 122, 124. The court also noted that the MDVR Birth Section Chief did not
object to removing a gestational surrogate's name from a birth certificate upon a court order.
Id. at 131-132. The approval of the Birth Section Chief of the MDVR was expressed when an
attorney wrote a letter to the Birth Section Chief regarding the issues of parentage that are at
issue in this case, which the Birth Section Chief signed and therefore acquiesced to. Id.
146. Id. at 126, 132. The court also discussed the issue of whether removal of the
gestational surrogate's name from the birth certificate comports with the best interests of the
child standard. Id. at 126-30. While the lower court had found that removing the gestational
surrogate's name from the birth certificate was not in the best interest of the child, the court
here found that the best interests of the child standard did not apply to the current case because
the dispute was not about asserting parental rights and fitness of a parent, but rather it was
about relinquishing parental rights. Id. at 130.
147. Id. at 132.
148. Id.
149. Id. (Cathell, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 134. Note, however, that the "intent test" to which Judge Cathell refers is not
the same "intent test" put forth in Johnson v. Calvert. See supra Part 11(l); see also Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). In Johnson, the court found that the person or people
who intended to procreate the child and raise it as their own would be the natural parent or
parents of the child. Id. Judge Cathell's interpretation of the majority's holding, on the other
hand, is an "intent test" where "if you do not intend to be the mother, you should not be
responsible as a mother." In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d. at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
151. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d. at 134-35 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 134. Judge Cathell went on to argue that under this "baby manufacturing"
system of surrogates, in vitro fertilization, and egg and sperm donors, all parties could escape
the burden of responsibility for the child because none intended to be a parent, which would
leave only the State to raise the child. Id.
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majority opinion, however, allowed surrogate mothers to disclaim
parental responsibility because they did not intend to be mothers to the
children they carried. 1
53
Judge Cathell then explained that the majority's opinion was
not aligned with the intent of either the General Assembly, which
enacted the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment, or the people of the
state and their representatives, who approved the statute.' He
explained that because the writers of the Equal Rights Amendment did
not intend to create a procedure by which children would have no
mothers on their birth certificates, the Equal Rights Amendment
should not be used for such purposes. 55
Judge Cathell also noted that the majority's opinion
overstepped the court's function by shaping public policy.156 He
argued that the Maryland General Assembly was in a better position
than the court to determine whether a mother's name should be
removed from a birth certificate because it had access to ethicists,
social scientists, scientific studies, and commissions.' 57 He also stated
the court's decision will negatively affect children in the long term by
eliminating a mother on whom the child could depend for support.
Furthermore, Judge Cathell argued that if the court's holding is
truly applied equally to men and women, children could potentially
have neither a mother nor a father listed on their birth certificate
because all parties who contributed to the creation of the child (in
other words, the sperm donor, the egg donor, and the surrogate) could
avoid responsibility because they did not intend to be a parent but were
rather just performing a specific service.1 59 Having neither a father nor
a mother on a birth certificate would likely cause tremendous problems
for children in the future when they agly for a passport, enlist in the
armed forces, and apply for college. Judge Cathell concluded his
dissent by criticizing the majority for failing to practice the appropriate
judicial restraint when deciding an issue best left to the General
Assembly. 161
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 132.
157. Id. at 135.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 135-36.
160. Id. at 136.
161. Id.
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Judge Harrell also dissented, with Judge Raker joining.' 62
Judge Harrell began by accepting, if not applauding, the majority's
"jurisprudential side-step" of reinterpreting the paternity statute so as
to avoid a constitutional issue of whether the statute violated
Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment. 163 However, Judge Harrell
criticized the fact that the majority answered the question of whether a
woman's name could be removed from a child's birth certificate in the
first place. 164 He argued that the procedural posture of the case was the
equivalent to a "walkover" in tennis, meaning that there was no party
to oppose or test Roberto d.B.'s contentions about the legality and
social acceptability of removing the mother's name from a birth
certificate.' In other words, because this case was an "In re"
proceeding, there was no party to oppose Roberto d.B.'s arguments,
and therefore the court accepted his proposals and position without
ever hearing a counterargument.166 Later in his opinion, Judge Harrell
reiterated the need for the court to hear opposing arguments and
suggested that counsel for the children be appointed to protect their
interests. 167
Judge Harrell then gave a much more detailed account of the
facts and procedural history of the case than the majority opinion
provided. 168 Judge Harrell discussed the case's procedural history to
show that Roberto d.B. did not raise the equal protection argument
until very late in the case's long procedural history.' 69 Judge Harrell
explained that Roberto d.B. had instead originally argued that the
mother should be removed from the birth certificate to serve the best
interests of the children and to prevent inaccurate official records from
being filed. 17
0
Judge Harrell argued that since the equal protection challenge
to the paternity statute was not properly presented to the lower court,
and instead insignificantly mentioned in an oral argument, the Court of
Appeals should neither have reached nor decided that issue. 17 1 He
162. Id. at 137. (Harrell, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
•164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 142.
168. Id. at 137-40.
169. Id. at 139-40.
170. Id. at 139.
171. Id. at 140-41. Judge Harrell cited to Md. Rule 8-131(a), which says that the
appellate court will not decide an issue "unless it plainly appears by the record to have been
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went on to say that the record needed further development before he
could agree with the majority's opinion.' 72 Judge Harrell also
suggested that the court should have considered the best interests of
the children in its analysis and decision. 173
Similar to Judge Cathell, Judge Harrell felt that the issue
decided by the majority "crie[d] out for legislative review and action,"
especially because the paternity statutes do not provide for or even
contemplate the recent advances in scientific methods for human
reproduction that have developed since the statutes were passed. 17
4
Judge Harrell concluded his dissent by stating that Roberto d.B. would
have to make a stronger and clearer equal protection argument to
receive his and Judge Raker's support on an issue best suited for the
legislature to decide.' 
75
IV. ANALYSIS
The Maryland Court of Appeals in the case of In re Roberto
d.B. allowed the removal of a gestational surrogate's name from two
children's birth certificates.' 76 The court reasoned that the processes by
which a man could challenge paternity, guaranteed by the paternity
statutes, must be made equally available to women to avoid a violation
of the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment. 177 The opinion aimed to be
very narrow and case-specific. 78 Chief Judge Bell wrote in a footnote
that "[t]his opinion does not attempt to predict the future of
reproductive technologies, it does not attempt to write policy on the
topic of surrogacy, and it does not define what a 'mother' is."'
179
However, In re Roberto d.B. 's simple reinterpretation of a statute may
have great implications for future cases that involve the use of
artificial reproductive technologies.
raised in or decided by the trial court," but the court may decide a new issue if it would guide
the trial court or prevent delay and extra expenses. Id. at 140 (citing MD. R. APP. REv. 8-
131(a)). However, Judge Harrell explained that the one-sidedness of the case combined with
the improper presentation of the equal protection argument prevented him from exercising the
discretion allowed by the rule. Id. at 140-41.
172. Id. at 142.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 137 n.l.
175. Id. at 142.
176. Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
177. Id. at 124.
178. See id. at 125, 126 n.15.
179. Id. at 126n.15.
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The court's decision protects the rights of both men and
women, but through different means. Most clearly, the court allows
women to deny parentage under the Equal Rights Amendment when
they are not genetically related to the child, just as a man may.180 The
decision also benefits men because it allows them to be fathers if they
so chose, which is a fundamental right recognized throughout this
country's history.181 Furthermore, the court's decision supports single
fathers and their ability to raise a child.
182
There are, however, some practical problems with the court's
decision, including whether the removal of the surrogate's name may
occur before the birth or whether the surrogate and father must file a
claim for removal every time. 183 In addition, the dissenting judges
raised important social and ethical concerns that the court should have
addressed, including whether the children should have representation
during hearings about removing a parent's name from the birth
certificate, 184 and whether the court should apply the best interests of
the child standard in such cases. 185
A. The Court's Adherence to Maryland Paternity Laws
Although the court in In re Roberto d.B. reinterpreted several
paternity and health law provisions,1 86 it adhered to case precedent and
Maryland's paternity and health law statutes and helped clarify the
meaning and breadth of those provisions. Most notably, the court
adhered to section 4-211 of the Health General Article'87 by
interpreting the word "parentage" as gender-neutral, therefore allowing
a modification of a child's birth certificate such that the mother's name
could be removed by order of a court.'1 88 In doing so, the court avoided
a conflict with the Equal Rights Amendment by allowing men and
women to equally deny parental obligations. 189
The court's decision is also in line with section 5-1038 of the
Family Law Article, which allows a declaration of paternity to be set
180. See infra Part IV(2)(i).
181. See infra Part IV(2)(ii).
182. See infra Part IV(2)(ii).
183. See infra Part IV(3).
184. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 142 (Harrell, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 125.
187. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 4-21 l(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007).
188. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 121-22.
189. Id. at 124-25.
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aside if a blood or genetics test excludes the person named as the
father. 190 The court acknowledged that in light of modem reproductive
technologies, it is possible for a woman to be genetically unrelated to
the child she carries and delivers. 19' Therefore, the court held that
section 5-1038 should be applied not only when a man denies
paternity, but also when a woman denies her maternity.192 The lack of
genetic connection between the child and the alleged parent is the key
piece of the puzzle, and in the case of gestational surrogacy, it is no
longer a gender-specific question.
B. The Impact of the Court 's Decision on Equal Rights and Parentage
Similar to Rand,'93 Giffin, 194 and Schroeder,195 which resolved
issues of parentage (child support, child custody, and choice of child's
surname, respectively), and resulted in equal treatment of men and
women in accordance with the Equal Rights Amendment, the court's
decision in the case of In re Roberto d.B. preserves equal rights for
both genders in the area of denying parental responsibility. Most
clearly, the court's decision benefits women and protects their
reproductive freedom. The court's decision also benefits men and
protects and supports their fundamental right to be parents. However,
some may argue that the court's decision stretches the meaning of the
Equal Rights Amendment too far-indeed, past its original purpose. 96
1. Expansion of Women's Rights
By allowing women to avoid parentage by proving that they
are genetically unrelated to a child, the court in In re Roberto d.B.
allowed women the same opportunity afforded to men, thereby
upholding the Equal Rights Amendment. 197 While women and men
cannot always be treated the same due to real differences between
them,' 98 the facts and the science of In re Roberto d.B. allowed for
190. MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1038(a)(2)(i)(2) (West 2007).
191. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 121-22.
192. Id. at 121-22.
193. 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977); see supra Part 11(3).
194. 716 A.2d 1029 (Md. 1998); see supra Part 11(3).
195. 790 A.2d 773 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); see supra Part 11(3).
196. See In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 124 (majority opinion).
198. See e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (finding that exclusion of women
from required registration in the Armed Services was not discriminatory because of true
differences between men and women and their ability to participate in combat).
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equal treatment of men and women in their ability to deny parentage.
Moreover, the court's decision allows women to serve as a surrogate
without fear that they will be obligated to be a legal parent to the child
they carried through the surrogacy process.199
Many of the Maryland cases that discussed equal rights in the
area of parentage resulted in an expansion of rights only for men. As
noted, in Rand v. Rand, the father no longer had to pay the majority of
the child support, but rather he and his ex-wife split the costs. 2°° In
Giffin v. Crane, the father maintained custody of his children because
the lower court erred when it considered gender in making its custody
determination. 20' Also, the Maryland parentage statutes have, up until
the current case, considered only paternity, and have been used solely
to protect men from unfair and inaccurate declarations of paternity.
The court in In re Roberto d.B., however, allows women some of the
same legal benefits. The court's decision protects women who choose
to act as surrogates from the legal and financial responsibilities of
motherhood when they only performed a service for a couple or
individual who could not have children on their own.
2. Expansion of Men's Rights
While the court's decision focuses on allowing women the
same opportunities to deny parentage as men, the decision also
benefits men and expands their parental rights. The right to conceive, • •203
and raise one's children is constitutionally protected, and has been
deemed by the United States Supreme Court as "essential ' 20 4 and "far
more precious ... than property rights." 20 5 The court in In re Roberto
d.B. reiterated this fundamental notion by allowing Roberto d.B. to
have children through the use of modem technology. By allowing the
199. The freedom to serve as a surrogate has a place amongst other reproductive
freedoms, such as the right to abortion. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding
Texas statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy unconstitutional).
200. Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977).
201. Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029 (Md. 1998).
202. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 5-1029 (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN. FAM.
LAW § 5-1038 (West 2007); Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389 (Md. 2000).
203. See Matter of Delaney, 617 P.2d 886, 890 (Okla. 1980) ("Parents have a
fundamental, constitutionally-protected interest in the continuity of the legal bond with their
children.").
204. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
205. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (invalidating an Illinois statute which presumed unwed fathers to be unfit to raise
their children in the event of the mother's death and holding that unwed fathers had a right to
be considered for custody of the children on an individualized basis).
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removal of the surrogate's name from the children's birth certificates,
the court acknowledged and supported single fatherhood.
3. Intent of the Drafters of the Equal Rights Amendment
In his dissent, Judge Cathell said that the majority's opinion "is
not what was fathomed when the General Assembly enacted the
[Maryland Equal Rights Amendment]. ' '206 Judge Cathell explained that
allowing a child to have a birth certificate without a listed mother does
not conform to the purpose of the Amendment.2 °7 Although Judge
Cathell correctly noted that the Equal Rights Amendment was not
established to "create a procedure whereby children would end up not
having any mothers, even at birth,, 20 8 it has been raised and applied in
parentage contexts for over thirty years.20 9 It was only a matter of time
before the courts applied it in the context of assisted reproductive
technologies. The majority's decision is sound because it simply
reinterprets the Maryland paternity statutes in light of advances in
technology to afford women the same opportunities as men to avoid an
incorrect determination of parentage.
C. Complications That May Arise from the Court's Decision
When the court in In re Roberto d.B. ordered the Maryland
Division of Vital Records to issue birth certificates for the twin girls
with no mother listed, it did so in the name of equal rights for men and
women. 2 1 However, the court's decision is likely to cause a number of
206. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 134 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J., dissenting).
207. Id. In Judge Cathell's theory that the majority has created a violation of the Equal
Rights Amendment with the "intent test" put forth by the majority, see supra Part III, his
reliance on the role of intent is misplaced. See id. at 134-35; see also supra note 150. Intent is
more likely to play a role when there is a dispute over who is the legal parent of the child, such
as in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). In In re Roberto d.B., there was no dispute
over who intended to be the parent of the twin girls. 923 A.2d at 118 (majority opinion). It
was clear that Roberto d.B. was the one who orchestrated the birth of the children, therefore he
is the intended parent. Id. at 117. "[G]estational surrogates should not be considered the
parents of any child resulting from an embryo donation and implantation, as such a finding
would contradict the intent of the parties at the time of transfer, which should govern."
KINDREGAN & McBRIEN supra note 39, at 119.
208. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 134 (Cathell, J., dissenting).
209. Contexts include adoption (see Bridges v. Nicely, 497 A.2d 142 (Md. 1985)), child
custody (see Giffin v. Crane, 716 A.2d 1029 (Md. 1998); McAndrew v. McAndrew, 382 A.2d
1081 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978)), child support (see Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 1977);
Kemp v. Kemp, 411 A.2d 1028 (Md. 1980)) and choice of child's surname (see Schroeder v.
Broadfoot, 790 A.2d 773 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002)).
210. In reRoberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 124-25, 126 (majority opinion).
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practical problems in its application. In addition, there are social and
ethical issues that courts should consider in future cases that involve
individuals who have conceived or want to conceive children through
assisted reproductive technologies.
The first question that must be answered is when an individual
who has hired a gestational surrogate should petition for an "accurate"
birth certificate. In the case of In re Roberto d.B., the modified birth
certificates, which only listed Roberto d.B.'s name and not the
surrogate's name, were presumably issued after the children's birth.2t'
However, some states allow the court to issue "pre-birth orders,"
which are judgments that establish, even before the child is born, that
the intended parents are the legal parents of the child, and order that
the child's birth certificate reflect that information. 2 1 Currently, no
Maryland statutes explicitly address pre-birth orders. Thus, the court's
decision affects the content of the child's birth certificate, but it does
not allow for any administrative convenience by allowing the parties to
agree on the content before the child is born. The court's
reinterpretation of section 4-211 of the Health General Article,
213
entitled "Authorization of new certificates of birth," implies that the
modifications to the birth certificate that occurred in In re Roberto d.B.
may only be applied after the child is born.
The court's decision may also raise questions of how hospital
staff should proceed when filling out a child's birth certificate when
they know that the mother is a gestational surrogate. As discussed
above, the court's decision focuses on modifying a preexisting,
"inaccurate" birth certificate to allow a parent to avoid an incorrect
determination of parentage. It is unlikely, therefore, that hospital staff
would modify the standard protocol for filling out a birth certificate in
light of this case. Instead, they will likely allow parents to file a claim
for a modification of the birth certificate under section 4-211 of the
Health General Article.
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In addition to the practical difficulties that may arise from the
court's decision, In re Roberto d.B. raises social and ethical issues that
211. In fact, almost six years had passed between the birth of the twin girls and the Court
of Appeals' decision. See id. at 115, 117.
212. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 39, at 140 n.41. There are several hurdles,
however, to obtaining a pre-birth order, such as a state's adoption laws, which may prevent the
birth mother from giving up her rights to the child before it is born. Id. at 140-41; see also
A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (finding that the surrogate
could not give up her parental rights until seventy-two hours after she gave birth).
213. MD. CODE ANN. HEALTH-GEN. § 4-21 l(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007).
214. Id.
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the courts and legislature should consider in future cases and statute
drafting. For instance, in his dissent, Judge Harrell suggested that the
children needed legal representation so that their best interests were
heard and considered. The majority, however, felt that the best
interests of the child standards did not apply to the case. 216 The
majority's position on this issue is more in line with precedent, namely
Langston v. Rife, where the court explicitly said that a consideration
of the best interests of the child in a parentage determination would
contradict the paternity statutes' legislative intent.2 17 In other words, it
is the right of the putative father to defend himself against false
accusations of paternity; a consideration of the best interests of the
child would likely bias the judge's decision of whether to grant the
father's requests for blood or genetics testing.2 18 The same theory can
be applied in cases where gestational surrogates are incorrectly named
the mother of the child they deliver. If the Maryland Court of Appeals
had considered the best interests of the children in Roberto d.B.'s case,
the court would have likely affirmed the lower court's decision to keep
the surrogate's name on the birth certificate, thereby legally binding
the surrogate to support the children. This would have been a
disturbing and unfair result because the surrogate was simply
performing a service for Roberto d.B., and none of the parties involved
intended for her to act as the children's mother.
Had the surrogate's name been kept on the birth certificate due
to consideration of the best interests of the children, the decision it
may have deterred future gestational surrogates, and possibly egg and
sperm donors as well, from assisting others for fear that they would be
pinned with parental responsibility. The court's holding, therefore, not
only guarantees equal protection of the laws between men and women,
but it also gives men and women the freedom to help others have
children without fear of legal repercussions.
V. CONCLUSION
In the case of In re Roberto d.B., the court applied old
parentage law to new facts. The court avoided a constitutional conflict
with the Maryland Equal Rights Amendment by reinterpreting
Maryland's health law and paternity statutes to allow a woman the
215. In reRoberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 142. (Harrell, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 126. (majority opinion).
217. Langston v. Riffe, 754 A.2d 389, 406 (Md. 2000).
218. Id.
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same opportunity as a man to avoid parental responsibility when there
was no genetic connection between herself and the child to which she
gave birth.219 The court therefore held that it was within a trial court's
power to order the Maryland Division of Vital Records to issue a birth
certificate with only the father's name listed.220 The court's decision
follows in a long line of cases that applied the Equal Rights
Amendment to parental obligations, but in this case the court also had
to consider the law's intersection with current technology. 221 The
court's holding allows women to avoid being incorrectly labeled as a
child's mother, an opportunity that men have enjoyed for many
years.222 Now women can freely serve as a surrogate to an individual
or a couple without fear of the legal, financial, and social ramifications
of motherhood. In addition, the court's decision benefits men because
it protects their fundamental right to be a father, and it acknowledges
that single fathers can provide a good life for a child.22' Though
several practical, social, and ethical concerns with the court's decision
remain, 22 the ultimate issue of equality between genders has been
resolved in this particular instance and will likely encourage the
passage of statutes that consider scientific advances in reproductive
technology.
219. In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d at 124-25.
220. Id. at 126.
221. See supra Part 11(3).
222. See supra Part IV(2)(i).
223. See supra Part IV(2)(ii).
224. See supra Part IV(3).
